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As technological developments have facilitated interactions
among nations and their residents, the United States has followed the
international trend of expanding jurisdiction over crime with interna-
tional elements. This article will briefly discuss the traditional bases
of asserting jurisdiction over such crimes.' The potential limitations
to the assertion of these bases of jurisdiction are also discussed. New
directions in the various jurisdicitional categories, all showing an ex-
pansion of jurisdiction, are examined. Finally, various mechanisms
with which to reduce tensions and limit the inevitable conflicts which
arise from the concurrent assertion of jurisdiction are suggested.
The very essence of criminal law is impregnated with the princi-
ple of the territorial sovereignty of the State. This principle requires
courts within the particular State to apply the forum's criminal law,
whereas in civil or commercial cases the courts may sometimes apply
foreign law. The inability to apply foreign law makes conflict of ju-
risdiction problems in criminal law cases more important and more
difficult to resolve. The potential for misunderstandings with other
I. For the purposes of this article, the term "crime" will include criminal sanctions im-
posed in a civil proceeding, as well as the more traditional concepts of criminal activity. In
certain instances, the distinction between a civil and criminal matter is blurred in the American
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States when they are denied the ability to assert criminal jurisdiction
is much greater than in civil cases.2
When analyzing trends in United States criminal jurisdiction, it
is useful to distinguish among (1) jurisdiction to prescribe (also re-
ferred to as legislative jurisdiction), (2) jurisdiction to enforce (or ex-
ecutive or enforcement jurisdiction) and (3) jurisdiction to
adjudicate.3
I. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE
Jurisdiction to prescribe is the authority of a State to make and
apply its law to things, or to the conduct, relations, status or interests
of persons via legislation, executive act or order, administrative rule
or even court action.4 According to the Restatement and subject to
certain limitations, under international law the United States may
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law with respect to:
1. a. Conduct, a substantial part of which occurs within its
territory;
b. The status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory;
c. Conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to
have substantial effect;
2. See, e.g., Szaszy, Conflict-of-Laws Rules in International Criminal Law and Municipal
Criminal Law in Western and Socialist Countries, in 2 M. BASSIOUNI & V. NANDA, A TREA-
TISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 135-68 (1973). A doctrinal problem underlying
jurisdictional and other international criminal legal issues is that international criminal law
results from the convergence of two different legal disciplines which have emerged and devel-
oped ostensibly along different routes. These two disciplines, the criminal aspects of interna-
tional law and the international aspects of natural criminal law, give international criminal law
a schizophhrenic character and magnify the potential for doctrinal confusion and divergent
approaches. Bassiouni, The Penal Characteristics of Conventional International Criminal Law,
15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 27 (1983).
3. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Revised)
§ 401 at 96 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Not all commenta-
tors agree on the categories of jurisdiction or the parameters of each category. See, e.g., Blake-
sley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1109 (1982); Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust and Securities Laws, 28
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 575 n.l (1979); Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An
Intersection Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 292 n.58
(1982); Feller, Jurisdiction Over Offenses with a Foreign Element, in BASSIOUNI & NANDA,
supra note 2, at 5, 9-10 (1973). See generally, Green, International Crimes and the Legal Pro-
cess, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 567 (1980). For a proper perspective, it is also useful to trace the
growth of the jurisdictional unit through recorded history. See, e.g., Muellen & Besharov, The
Scope and Significance of International Criminal Law, in BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 2,
at 5, 6 (1973).
4. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, introductory notes to Pt. IV (Jurisdiction and Judg-
ments), at 87-95.
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2. The conduct, status, interests or relations of its nationals
outside its territory; or
3. Certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its
nationals which is directed against the security of the State or cer-
tain State interests.5
A. Bases of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Since the 1935 Harvard Research Drafts on International Law,
the above theories have been identified with the following five bases
of criminal jurisdiction: (1) territorial, (2) protective, (3) nationality,
(4) passive personality and (5) universal.6 Federal and state court de-
cisions in the United States, as well as most textbooks and treatises,
adopt these bases.7
1. The Territorial Principle. In general, territoriality is the typ-
ical and nationality the exceptional base for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion. Both bases of jurisdiction may be relevant in some
circumstances. For instance, jurisdiction based on effects in a partic-
ular territory is more easily utilized when it is applied to nationals of
the State exercising the jurisdiction.'
Historically, three different practices have been noted regarding
the claim of extraterritorial criminal jurisdictiion. One group of
States, which includes the United States and the United Kingdom,
emphasizes the territorial nature of a criminal act. Nations in this
group do not admit that a State may punish an alien for a breach of
criminal law where the act is committed outside its territory.9 A sec-
ond group, which includes France, Germany and the majority of
States, also asserts jurisdiction on a territorial basis. In addition,
these States allow the assertion of jurisdiction where acts are directed
against the security of the State or its financial credit.1 ° A third
group, which includes Turkey and Italy, is not restrained in the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by territorial factors. These nations assert their
jurisdiction when the crime, wherever committed, is a social evil
which all civilized nations are interested in suppressing. This juris-
5. Id. § 402, at 98.
6. Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435 (Supp. 1935).
7. Blakesley, supra note 3, at 2 n.5.
8. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 comment b, at 98-99.
9. For background on extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction in English law, see Lew, The
Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction of English Courts, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 168 (1978);
Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145 (1972-73).
10. See, e.g., Feller, supra note 3, at 26-28.
Vol. 15
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diction is referred to as the universality principle. In practice, how-
ever, these States will assert jurisdiction only for acts of foreigners
committed abroad when the "crimes" are prejudicial to the State or
one of its nationals."t
Traditionally, the United States and the United Kingdom have
at least theoretically denied the ability of a State to assert criminal
jurisdiction outside of its territory against a non-national. They be-
lieve, however, that in certain circumstances a crime may be commit-
ted within the territory of a State and therefore be justiciable by its
criminal courts even though the actor is physically outside the terri-
tory. Moreover, these States assert jurisdiction when an act is com-
mitted physically outside the territory but injures, harms or affects its
citizens or interests located within its territory. The basis for juris-
diction in such cases is often referred to as "objective territorial juris-
diction."' 2  Recently, U.S. prosecutors and courts have relied
increasingly on the "objective territorial jurisdiction" or the "effects"
doctrine, as it is also called.' 3
2. The Protective Principle. Under the protective principle, a
State has the right to exert jurisdiction over a certain class of limited
offenses which are committed outside its territory by non-nationals.
This claim may be invoked to assert jurisdiction when the offenses
are directed against the security of the State or against important
State interests or functions. 1' While the protective principle is sel-
dom invoked in the United States, it has been used to establish juris-
diction over non-nationals who make false statements on visa
applications at U.S. consulates. 1' Some United States courts have
asserted the protective principle simultaneously with the objective
11. 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-95 (1970).
12. Rex v. Godfrey, [1923] 24 K.B.; Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927). See also
J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 232-33 (5th ed. 1955).
13. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 148-161 (discussion of the interaction between "ef-
fects" and "nationality" in the Marc Rich case, on the one hand, and in Bank of Nova Scotia II
and Falconer cases on the other). Many crimes contained in the United States Code are based
on interstate commerce and use of the mails, including federal securities laws.
14. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 comment d, at 99; Harvard Research in Interna-
tional Law, The Draft Convention With Respect to Crime, arts. 7, 8, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 435
(Supp. 1935); WHITEMAN, supra note 11, at 95-100. Representative offenses include: espio-
nage, counterfeiting of the State's seal or currency, the falsification of official documents, per-
jury before consular officials and conspiracies to violate immigration and custom laws.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.
Cal. 1960); United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (C.D. Cal. 1943).
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territoriality principle to support criminal jurisdiction.16
3. The Nationality (or Active Personality) Principle. The
United States does not often base extraterritorial jurisdiction on the
nationality of the offender.17 This jurisdictional base, which is re-
ferred to as the nationality or active personality principle, is most
often applied in situations which involve subsidiaries of United States
corporations rather than to individual citizens.
The nationality principle is derived from the notion of State sov-
ereignty under which nationals are entitled to their State's protection
even while outside of its territorial boundaries. These individuals
have a corresponding obligation of allegiance to national laws even
when outside of the State of which they are citizens."8 The national-
ity principle is universally recognized in international law, although
its precise definition and application differ widely. 19
United States federal criminal legislation, in comparison with
other national penal codes such as the German Penal Code or the
Japanese Draft Penal Code,2" is not expressly based on nationality.
Prosecution for treason in the United States, however, is a longstand-
ing example of criminal jurisdiction based on the nationality princi-
ple. The implication of treason cases, specifically Kawakita v. United
States,21 is that treason can only be committed by one who is a citi-
16. See, e.g., Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
948 (1961). See also Blakesley, supra note 3, at 3.
17. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402(2), at 98. With the exception of legal areas such
as tax, selective service and more recently foreign corrupt payments, criminal law has been the
primary competence of state legislatures, which have followed the common law tradition of
basing jurisdiction primarily on territorial principles and secondarily on residence and domicile
rather than nationality. Id. § 402, reporters' notes, at 102.
18. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 62 T.L.R. 208 (1946); M. BASSIOUNI, IN-
TERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 251 (1974); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 290, 686-89 (8th ed. 1955).
19. BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 250-51. For five types of legislative enactments of for-
eign States implementing this principle, see SWEDISH PENAL CODE ch. I, art. I. See also Pub-
lic Prosecutor v. Atoni, 32 INT'L L. REP. 140 (1960) (assertion of jurisdiction over Swede for
auto accident in Germany); Re Gutierrez, 24 INT'L L. REP. 265 (1957) (assertion of jurisdic-
tion by Mexican Court over Mexican citizens for theft of truck in Texas). These and other
cases are discussed in S. WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 47-54 (3d ed. 1978)
(Unpub. casebook materials for course at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto).
20. GERMAN PENAL CODE § 4; JAPANESE DRAFT PENAL CODE arts. 4, 5; George, Ex-
traterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REV. 609, 620 (1966). See generally
L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 445 (1980).
21. Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952). See also Gillars v. United States, 182
F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (lst Cir. 1948), cert. de-
nied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
Vol. 15
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zen. In contrast with decisions of courts in other countries,22 United
States courts are content to base jurisdiction in treason cases solely
on the nationality principle. Other States often assert jurisdiction in
such cases based on the protective principle.
Another traditional use of the nationality principle has been in
the enjoining of trademark infringement where the acts were done
outside of the United States.23 Most of the traditional applications of
the nationality principle, however, relate to national security. Such
traditional applications include failure of United States citizens to
comply with selective service law, 24 the Logan Act25 and regulations
promulgated under the Trading with the Enemy Act.2 6
In Blackmer v. United States,27 the United States Supreme
Court upheld the issuance of a subpoena, pursuant to statute, to a
U.S. citizen residing abroad. The subpoena required his attendance
in a United States court as a witness. In upholding the subpoena, the
Supreme Court commented: "The jurisdiction of the United States
over its absent citizen, so far as the binding effect of its legislation is
concerned, is a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to
take notice of the laws that are applicable to him and obey them."
28
Some commentators have correctly criticized jurisdiction based
on nationality alone29 where the crime over which jurisdiction is as-
serted is not also a crime where it is committed.3" In practice, the
attempt to prosecute a person solely on the nationality principle ne-
cessitates cooperation from another State. In the absence of an extra-
dition treaty, the willingness of the country to extradite may depend
in part on the political relations of the United States vis-a-vis the
other State, and in part on the exercise of restraint by the United
States in extraterritorial enforcement of its criminal laws. Of course,
22. See, e.g., Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] Q.B. 347; Rex v. Neumann,
[1949] 3 S. Afr. L.R. 1238.
23. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
24. 50 U.S.C. § 453 (Supp. III 1979) (this act requires every male United States citizen to
register for military service).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (this Act prohibits any United States citizen wherever located from
carrying on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government in its relations
with the United States).
26. 31 C.F.R. § 500.329(a)(1).
27. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
28. Id. at 438.
29. The exception in which jurisdiction based on nationality alone seems appropriate is in
cases related to national security. See supra notes 24-26.
30. Epstein, The Extraterritorial Reach of Proposed Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975-
S. ., 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 275, 284-85 (1976). See, e.g., Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Crimi-
nal Law, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 346, 363 (1972).
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choice of law and other policy considerations also come into play. a1
4. The Passive Personality Principle. The passive personality
principle permits a State, in certain circumstances, to apply its crimi-
nal law to an act committed outside its territory by a non-national
because the victim of the act was its national. The principle is nor-
mally applied only in instances where terrorist and other organized
attacks are made against a State's nationals because of their national-
ity. It also is applied when a State's ambassadors or government offi-
cials are assassinated.32
5. Universal Jurisdiction. Under the principle of universal ju-
risdiction a State may exercise jurisdiction to prescribe for a class of
offenses known as delicta juris gentium . 3 These acts constitute
crimes under international law which are recognized by the commu-
nity of nations as warranting universal concern. 4 Such crimes by
their nature threaten to undermine, the very foundations of the en-
lightened international community.3" Each State has the right to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over the offender, even where the other
jurisdictional bases are not present. In order to exercise universal
jurisdiction, however, the offender must be in the prescribing State's
territory. The nexus between the offender and the lex loci deprehen-
sionis36 is considered the injury which the offense causes to the foun-
dation and security of the entire community. As such, each State has
the power to exercise criminal jurisdiction. 7 The offenses for which
universal jurisdiction may be exercised include piracy, slave trade,
attacks on or hijacks of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and
terrorism. 38
6. The Representation Principle. When the application of the
traditional principles discussed above fails to establish jurisdiction,
resort may be had to the representation principle. This residuary
doctrine may be employed by a State faced with punishing an of-
31. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 252-55.
32. See Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (Judgement of
Sept. 7); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 402 comments e, f & g, at 100.
33. That is, crimes under international law.
34. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 404, at 114.
35. Jescheck, Crimes du droit des gens, 36 R. INT'L DR. PENAL 503-544 (1965).
36. That is, the law of the place in which an offense is committed.
37. Feller, supra note 3, at 32-34.
38. Some of the international agreements providing for universal criminal jurisdiction are
set forth in RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 404 reporters' note, at 116.
Vol. 15
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fender physically present in its territory for acts committed outside
its territory. These illegal acts are typically of such a nature that the
offender is not eligible for extradition to the other State. A jurisdic-
tional problem of this nature ususally arises when (1) there is no mu-
tual extradition agreement between the two countries, (2) the
offender is a national of the extraditing State or (3) extradition is not
worthwhile considering the de minimis nature of the offense.3 9 In
such instances, the State in whose territory the act was committed
will request the State with custody to bring an action against the
offender. A prerequisite for establishing this jurisdiction is that the
offense must be recognized as a crime in both States. Without this
dual recognition the State bringing the action has no legal basis to
proceed.'
The representation principle extends the concept of comminio
juris, that is, the will of nations to create a semblance of worldwide
communal jurisdiction. Thus, the principle is an attempt to promote
the idea that offenders have no asylum from punishment.4 1 How-
ever, with but a few exceptions, application of the representation
principle has been minimal.42
7. Regulation of Activities Aboard Vessels or Aircraft. Custom-
ary international law permits a State to apply its law to activities,
persons or things aboard a vessel or aircraft registered in the State. 3
In addition, serious offenses committed aboard a foreign vessel or
aircraft "in the commerce of the United States" may be within the
jurisdiction of the United States under the objective territorial
principle."
39. BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 2 at 35 (1973).
40. Id. at 36.
41. Id. at 37.
42. See, e.g., European Convention for the Punishment of Road Traffic Offenses, Nov. 30,
1964, Trites et Conventions Europeenees No. 52; CRIMINAL LAW OF SWITZERLAND art. 101
(Road Transport Law of Dec. 19, 1958).
43. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, 146-
55, 230-37 (2d ed. 1981).
44. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403 reporters' note 8, at 113. Criminal Jurisdiction in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, on board spacecraft, space laborato-
ries or other space objects in outer space is in need of clarification, although the Outer Space
Treaty provides a beginning. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. See also Gorove, Criminal Juris-
diction in Outer Space, in BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 2, at 48-57 (1973).
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B. Instances of Increased Tension Due to the United States'
Expansion of Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Over the past twenty years, some States, particularly the United
States, have attempted to prescribe their law on the basis of very
broad conceptions of territoriality and nationality. Increased inter-
national tensions have resulted. Attention has also been focused on
the pernicious effects which result when States make conflicting as-
sertions of jurisdiction. For example, enforcement of the United
States Trading with the Enemy Act against Canadian subsidiaries of
United States companies which trade with China has strained rela-
tions between the United States and Canada.45 Another example oc-
curred in 1964-65, when France became incensed over the Fruehauf
episode, which resulted from the participation by a French subsidiary
of a United States-owned company in a transaction with China. The
transaction took place during a period when France was encouraging
and the United States was prohibiting trade with China.4 6 Resent-
ment has also occurred between the United Kingdom, France, Japan
and the United States with respect to shipping. The United States
has resented efforts by these three countries to give governmental
protection to what it considers monopolistic or unfair practices. In
turn, these three States resent attempts by the United States Federal
Maritime Commission to set rules for ocean shipping conferences.4 7
More recently, extraterritorial jurisdiction by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has also resulted in tension and
resentment abroad." More notable, however, have been attempts by
the United States Department of Justice to enforce United States an-
titrust laws abroad. The United States investigation of the Swiss
45. See, e.g., Joint Statement on Export Policies of July 9, 1958, 39 DEP'T ST. BULL. 209
(1959); Corcoran, The Trading With the Enemy Act and the Controlled Canadian Corporation,
14 MCGILL L.J. 174 (1968); GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
CANADA (The Gray Report) (1972).
46. A. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS 80-93 (1977); Craig, Appli-
cation of the Trading With the Enemy Act to Foreign Corporations Owned by Americans: Re-
flections on Fruehauf v. Massardy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 579 (1970).
47. See, e.g., A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH & A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PRO-
CESS 348-488 (1968); May, The Status of Federal Maritime Commission Shipping Regulation
Under the Principles of International Law, 54 GEO. L.J. (1966); O.E.C.D. COMPROMISE, re-
printed in 52 DEP'T ST. BULL. 188 (1965).
48. See, e.g., Loomis & Grant, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial
Institutions Outside the U.S. and Extraterritorial Applications of the US. Securities Laws, I J.
COMP. COR. L. & SEC. REG. 3 (1978). But see Widner, The U.S. Securities Laws-Banking
Law of the World? A Reply to Messrs. Loomis and Grant, 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39
(1978). See also H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 1047-74 (2d
ed. 1976). See the cases cited in RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 416, at 144.
Vol. 15
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watch industry in the 1960's strained relations with Switzerland.49
Earlier efforts to stop cartels in electric light bulbs and nylon resulted
in conflict between the United States, the Netherlands and the
United Kingdom.5 °
Another example of the United States' assertion of a very broad
concept of territorial jurisdiction is the recent Datasaab case.5 ' On
April 24, 1984, a U.S. District Court fined a major Swedish electron-
ics firm, Datasaab Contracting AB, 3.1 million dollars for illegally
selling the Soviet Union a highly sophisticated TERCAS radar sys-
tem in violation of the United States export control law. The indict-
ment against Datasaab-the first charge of United States export law
violations filed against a foreign company-was precedent-setting be-
cause the company was half-owned by the Swedish government at
the time of the transfers. In this case, the company wanted to con-
tinue doing business with the United States, so it agreed to be bound
by the court's decision. The fine equaled the value of the goods
shipped.
5 2
A final example of the United States attempts to expand its juris-
diciton to prescribe is shown in the recent efforts to reform federal
criminal statutes. Areas of criminal activity which are more special-
ized, such as transnational terrorism, have been the subject of sweep-
ing U.S. legislation. 53  Unfortunately, the politicization of
transnational terrorism and the failure of many developing countries
to agree on definitions of terrorism limit the ability of the United
States to enforce such laws when terrorists take haven within their
borders.
In addition to the aforementioned instances of increasing ten-
49. COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 311-363 (Rahl ed. 1970); Samie, Ex-
traterritorial Enforcement of United States Anti-trust Laws: The British Reaction, 16 INT'L
LAW. 313 (1982).
50. See, e.g., EBB, REGULATION AND PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 555-
82, 587-98 (1964). See also K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
46-51 (1958).
51. United States v. Datasaab Contracting, AB., No. 84-130 Crim. (D.D.C. Apr. 24,
1984) (Datasaab pleaded Nolo contendre).
52. Wash. Post, Apr. 28, 1984, at Al, col. 1. Corporations violating export coitrol laws
can be barred from future trading with U.S. companies, causing them severe economic hard-
ship. For strategies in prosecuting and defending a request for mutual assistance in criminal
matters in cases involving the Export Administration Act, see Zagaris & Kochinke, Swiss
Supreme Court Grants U.S. Request in the U.S.S.R. Computer Case, 56 TAXES INT'L 81 (June
1984).
53. See generally, Firearm Felonies By Foreign Diplomats, 1984: Hearings on S.2771
Before the Subcomm. on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
C~ng.. 2d Sess. (1984).
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sion due to the assertion of conflicting jurisdiction, there are counter-
vailing legal and policy restrictions which limit the United States
jurisdiction to prescribe.
C. Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe
1. Constitutional Limitations. The United States Constitution,
the Bill of Rights and principles of federalism limit the jurisdiction of
the United States Congress to prescribe and apply law. Congress,
however, has been held to possess authority, often referred to as its
"foreign affairs power," stemming from the implicitly sovereign
power of the United States government. 4 States are limited in their
power to prescribe law not only by the limitations of international
law, but also by the Supremacy Clause, United States treaties and
federal law." In addition, states are precluded from intruding on the
exclusive federal authority in foreign affairs. 6 Subject to these limi-
tations, exercise of jurisdiction by states is governed by the same ju-
risdictional principles whether the exercise of jurisdiction has
international or only domestic implications." Extraterritorial appli-
cation of law by states has been based on acts or omissions having an
"effect" within the state5", and additionally on slave trading, attacks
on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes and terrorism.
2. Limitations of Reasonableness. Even if one of the bases for
jurisdiction is present, a State may not apply law to conduct having
links with another State or States when the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion is unreasonable. The determination of whether the exercise of
jurisdiction is unreasonable is evaluated in view of all relevant fac-
tors. These include:
(1) the extent to which the activity (a) occurs within the reg-
ulating State, or (b) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect
upon or in the regulating State;
(2) the links, such as nationality, residence, or economic ac-
tivity, between the regulating State and the persons principally re-
sponsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that State and
those whom the law or regulation is intended to protect;
54. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936);
Perez v. Brownwell, 356 U.S. 253 (1967).
55. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
56. Zschernig v. Miller, 309 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
57. See generally George, supra note 20; Rotenburg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdic-
tion and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEX. L. REv. 763 (1960).
58. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
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(3) the character of the activity to be regulated, the signifi-
cance of regulation to the regulating State, the extent to which
other States regulate such activities, and the extent to which the
goals of such regulations are generally accepted;
(4) the existence of justified expectations that might be pro-
tected or hurt by the regulation in question;
(5) the significance of regulation to the international political,
legal or economic system;
(6) The extent to which another State may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and
(7) the potential of conflict with regulation by other States.59
In addition to these factors, an exercise of jurisdiction may be
unreasonable if it requires a person to take action that would violate
a regulation of another State, even if it is not unreasonable under the
above criteria. Priority between conflicting exercises of jurisdiction is
determined by evaluating the respective interests of the regulating
States in view of the seven factors."
3. Limitations Imposed by International Agreements. The
Draft European Convention on Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal
Matters also provides for priorities to determine jurisdictional con-
flicts. The Convention confers upon one State the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction while simultaneously recognizing the jurisdic-
tion claimed by other States on the basis of their international crimi-
nal law. The Convention also provides procedural protection to
foreigners tried by courts in the State of primary jurisdiction and in-
troduces the safeguard of non bis in idem. A second State is thereby
prevented from trying the offender again for the same offense once he
has stood trial in the first State. In general, the State on whose terri-
tory the offense is committed has priority.6 ' The Convention also
provides means for collaboration among States that each have
jurisdiction.6 2
4. Limitations Imposed by "Blocking Statutes." By the end of
1980, at least seven foreign States and two Canadian provinces had
enacted "blocking statutes," which gave their citizens protection
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403(2), at 103.
60. Id. § 403(3) at 105. See also Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Con-
flict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions For Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES
COURS 321 (1979).
61. Draft European Conventions on Conflicts of Jurisdiction in Criminal Matters, art. 2.
62. Id. art. 8. See also COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Doc. No. 1873, REPORT ON THE SETrLE-
MENT OF CONFLICTS OF JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (1965).
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against inquiries by authorities in the United States.6 3 In 1980, the
United Kingdom enacted a law directed specifically against assertion
of "extraterritorial jurisdiction" by the United States. 4 The law per-
mits the British Minister of Trade to direct persons in Great Britain
to disobey the laws or court orders of an "overseas country" insofar
as they apply outside the territorial jurisdiction of the country. This
law applies where the Minister determines that compliance with the
overseas law or order would be damaging to the trading interests of
the United Kingdom or would infringe on its own jurisdiction.
In response to these and similar reactions, some members of the
United States legal community are attempting to modify some asser-
tions of jurisdiction. 65 Attempts to limit the assertion of criminal
jurisdiction to prescribe are undertaken primarily by United States
academic and advisory bodies. In contrast, the promulgation of reg-
ulations by the Reagan Administration to extend export controls on
oil and gas technology to the Soviet Union has again sparked contro-
versy and resentment against extraterritorial assertion of United
States jurisdiction. These regulations include exports of goods
originating outside of the United States and technical data of U.S.-
owned or controlled companies wherever organized or doing busi-
ness, as well as foreign-produced products of United States technical
data. The violation of these regulations may invoke criminal as well
as civil penalties.66
II. JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE CRIMINAL LAW
"Jurisdiction to enforce" is the exercise by a State of authority
to compel or induce compliance. In criminal law this means impos-
ing sanctions for noncompliance with laws and regulations, whether
through judicial proceedings or otherwise.67 Jurisdiction to enforce
63. Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
64. Protection of British Trading Interests Act, ch. 11 (1980).
65. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 415 reporters' notes 5, 7, at 140-141.
66. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 27250 (1982). See generally Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Bal-
dridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982) (plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against Commerce
Department sanctions against him for violation of oil and gas technology export controls with
regard to the Soviet Pipeline case). See also Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of
Foreign Policy: The History, Legal Issues, and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 L. &
POL'Y INT'L BuS. 1, 108-116 (1983); Marcuss & Richard, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439
(1981); ABA Comm. on the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, Draft Recommendations
(1983) (Statement of Policy on Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Act).
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criminal law is normally exercised by administrative agencies. Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,68 Congress delegated to the SEC
the authority to promulgate regulations requiring strict accounting
controls and mandatory disclosure. Federal agencies have increas-
ingly become more aggressive in enforcing criminal law extra-
territorially.
A. The Expanded U.S. Assertion of Jurisdiction to Enforce
On September 21, 1981, President Reagan, in order to stem the
tide of illegal immigration to the United States, proclaimed in an Ex-
ecutive Order69 that the entry of undocumented aliens from the high
seas would be prevented by the interdiction of vessels carrying such
aliens. The order authorizes the Secretary of State to enter into coop-
erative arrangements with governments of countries from which the
illegal immigrations were occurring, and also authorizes the Coast
Guard to stop and board vessels of foreign countries with which the
United States has such cooperative agreements. The Coast Guard
may only board ships outside the territorial waters of the United
States when there is reason to believe that such vessels are engaged in
the irregular transportation of persons in violation of U.S. law, or the
law of a country with which the United States has an arrangement.
The rationale for this assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the
protective principle, that is, to protect United States sovereignty from
a rising tide of undocumented aliens.
The U.S. Coast Guard may also intercept vessels on the high
seas which are listed on its weekly publication as those suspected of
transporting illicit narcotics. In United States v. Keller,7" the Coast
Guard located such a vessel on the high seas thirty miles north of
Puerto Rico heading in a westerly direction towards the United
States. The U.S. vessel, which had an American crew, was searched
and 300 pounds of marijuana were discovered. In rejecting the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdicton, the
court held that although the acts allegedly occurred outside United
States territory, jurisdiction existed under the protective principle.71
The rationale behind the holding was that the planned invasion of
U.S. customs territory had a potentially adverse effect on security
and governmental functions. Specifically, such an invasion violated
68. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
69. Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
70. State v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631 (1978).
71. Id. at 635.
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the prohibition under U.S. customs law of the importation of certain
controlled substances.72
In 1981 Congress extended limited jurisdiction over drug en-
forcement on the high seas to the U.S. armed forces.73 Previously,
this jurisdiction was the exclusive province of the Coast Guard. An
amendment to the 1876 Possi Comitatus Act authorizes the armed
forces to provide training, advice and the use of military facilities and
equipment to civilian authorities, most notably the Coast Guard and
U.S. Customs. 74 Originally, the Possi Comitatus Act was enacted to
prevent U.S. military personnel from making civil law arrests and, in
general, from acting as civil law enforcement agents. The new law
allows the Armed Forces to work closely with law enforcement agen-
cies engaged in stemming the flow of illegal substances into the
United States. The amendment, however, keeps intact the basic
premise of the Possi Comitatus Act, namely, that U.S. armed forces
personnel cannot arrest civilians outside of U.S. military bases.
The jurisdictional implications of this amendment are already
being felt. In July 1983, the U.S.S. Kidd, a Navy destroyer, opened
fire on a "suspicious looking" freighter, the Ranger, 40 miles north of
Puerto Rico in international waters.75 The freighter, registered in
Honduras, was followed by the Kidd and eventually hit. The Kidd,
following the practice of Navy vessels involved in this type of opera-
tion, lowered its Navy flag and raised a Coast Guard flag before it
opened fire.76 Incidents such as this indicate clearly that the current
Administration is intent on extending to new limits the United
States' jurisdiction to enforce its criminal laws.
In addition, the Internal Revenue Service has recently promul-
gated proposed regulations for U.S. citizens who are shareholders of
certain foreign corporations in order to prevent, inter alia, tax eva-
sion.77 Similarly, sections 336 through 342 of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) provide for enforcement
72. Id. The Court, however, ruled that it did not have jurisdiction over the second count
of the indictment (possession of marijuana with intent to distribute) under the protective prin-
ciple, apparently because the federal statutes proscribing conspiracy to import and attempting
to import marijuana could be applied extraterritorially. The statute which proscribed posses-
sion with intent to distribute could only be applied within the boundaries of the United States.
Id. at 635 n.8. See Note, Drug Smuggling and the Protective Principle: A Journey into Unchar-
tered Waters, 39 LA. L. REv. 1189 (1979).
73. Possi Comitatus Act, Pub. L. No. 97-86 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 1385 (1982)).
74. Id.
75. National L.J., Feb. 13, 1984, at Al, col. 4.
76. Id.
77. 46 C.F.R. 7401 (Prop. Amend. to § 1.600-1 of Income Tax Regulations). See also
Vol. 15
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of IRS summonses on United States citizens residing outside the
United States.7" These regulations restrict taxpayers from using the
requested documentation to prove their view of the transactions in
court. Likewise, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) has recently published a proposed rule which would require
a Futures Commission Merchant (FCM), trader or foreign broker to
provide the Commission, upon special call, market information con-
cerning its accounts.79 The proposed rule also provides that if the
FCM trader or foreign broker fails to respond to the special call, the
CFTC may direct the appropriate contract market and all FCMs to
prohibit further trades.8 0 This proposed rule, as the cases discussed
below and recent Congressional hearings demonstrate," clearly
shows that the CTFC is promulgating rules which will increasingly
extend its extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. 2
B. The Results of this Trend
As a result of the trend toward expanded assertion by the
United States of its jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws, individuals
and institutions are increasingly caught in situations where they are
forced to violate either U.S. law or the law of their domicile. While
compromises are sometimes achieved, such enforcement efforts add
fuel to the resentment of extraterritorial assertions of criminal juris-
diction." In response, many foreign nations produce blocking legis-
lation. Unless the U.S. government either shows more restraint or
concludes bilateral or multilateral agreements, its attempts to unilat-
erally assert its jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws will produce
more tension and further diminish United States political interests
abroad.84
Zagaris, The IRS Public Hearing on the Books and Records of Foreign Entities, 26 TAXES INT'L
6, 7 (Dec. 1981).
78. 46 C.F.R. 7401 (Prop. Amend. to § 1.600-1 of Income Tax Regulations).
79. 47 C.F.R. § 23,951 (June 2, 1982).
80. Id.
81. See generally COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, SILVER PRICES AND THE AD-
EQUACY OF FEDERAL ACTIONS IN THE MARKET PLACE 1979-80, H.R. Doc. No. 395, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
82. See Greenstone, The Foreign Commodity Trader: A Regulatory Dilemma, 30 AD. L.
REV. 535-48 (1978).
83. See Zagaris, Judge Paine Socks it to the Bank of Nova Scotia-The Continuing Saga of
the Bank of Nova Scotia Case, 54 TAXES INT'L 12-20 (Apr. 1984).
84. See Zagaris, Developments in International Enforcement, 49 TAXES INT'L 4 (Nov.
1983).
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III. JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE CRIMINAL LAW
"Jurisdiction to adjudicate" is the authority of a State to subject
persons to the process of its courts, and particularly to enforce the
State's laws and regulations. Since the three categories of jurisdiction
are implemented by different branches of United States federal and
state governments, and since jurisdictional decisions are implemented
by constitutional law, international law, statutory interpretation, for-
eign policy and practical considerations, such decisions are not al-
ways consistent or rational.8
A. General Principles
A United States court can try a criminal action for violation of
domestic law, but not for violation of a criminal law of a foreign
State. 6 Even if authorized by statute, the trial of a defendant for
violation of a foreign law could be deemed a denial of due process
under the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments. Courts in the
United States can exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate only pursuant to
law or the Constitution. Subject to Article III and other constitu-
tional limitations, Congress determines the jurisdiction of federal
courts.87 The jurisdiction of state courts in the United States is deter-
mined by its own state constitution and is further limited by the
United States Constitution, particularly the supremacy of treaties
and federal law under the Supermacy Clause.88
According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, which
in turn adopts the principles of the Restatement of Conflicts of Law,
a State may exercise jurisdiction (criminal or civil) over a person if
the relationship of the person (or thing) to the State makes the exer-
cise of such jurisdiction reasonable.89 A State's exercise of jurisdic-
tion is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted, any one of the
following applies: (1) the person (or thing) is present in the territory
of the State (other than transitorily); (2) the person, if a natural per-
son, is either domiciled, a resident or a national of the foreign State;
(3) the person, if a legal person, is organized pursuant to the law of
the State; (4) the person, whether natural or judicial, regularly con-
ducts business in the State; (5) the person, whether natural or judi-
cial, had carried on activity in the State which created liability, but
85. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, at 93.
86. United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
87. U.S. CONST. art. III.
88. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 442 comment b, at 164.
89. Id. § 441(1).
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only in respect of such activity; or (6) the person, whether natural or
judicial, had conducted outside the State an activity having a sub-
stantial, direct or foreseeable effect within the State, which created
liability, but only in respect to such activity.9°
In addition, several constitutional issues, particularly those deal-
ing with safeguarding the rights of the accused, may arise when an
individual is arrested for an offense in which international elements
are present. For example, under the NATO Status of Forces Agree-
ments9 and comparable agreements with other countries, the United
States has authority to exercise substantial criminal jurisdiction over
its military and other defense personnel present in those countries.
Many cases have recently arisen involving contempt convictions
and other penalties against persons, including foreign individuals and
entities, for failure to respond to subpoenas.92 These penalties have
been upheld in most cases, despite the fact that many of the defend-
ants have claimed the conflicting law of a foreign nation as a de-
fense.9" Negotiations between the United States and countries in
which such subpoened persons reside have resulted in informal agree-
ments. Thus, agreements such as the Memorandum of Understand-
ing on Insider Trading (MOU) between the United States and
Switzerland can be expected to further extend the authority of
United States courts to enforce their discovery orders in criminal
cases.
94
Moreover, many recent cases have litigated the application of
United States constitutional protections abroad. The bulk of these
cases have concerned warrantless searches and seizures by the United
States Coast Guard in which issues of jurisdiction as well as the ad-
missibility of evidence have been raised.95 Other cases have con-
90. Id. § 442(2).
91. North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792,
T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67. See also Coker, The Status of Visiting Military Forces in
Europe: NA TO-SOFA, Comparison, in BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 2, at 115 (1973).
92. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); U.S. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 569 F.
Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
93. See, e.g., U.S. v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Field, 532 F.2d
404, 407 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied, 535 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W.
3341 (1976). See also Browne, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based on Good Faith, 83
COL. L. REV. 1320 (1983); Note, Compelling Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign
Law: An Examination and Re-evaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877
(1982).
94. See, e.g., Zagaris, The Netherlands Signs a Treaty with the U.S. for 'Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters' which Embraces Tax Matters, 30 TAXES INT'L 4 (Apr. 1982); Zagaris,
The Swiss/US. Consultations on 'Insider Trading', 30 TAXES INT'L 46 (Apr. 1982).
95. See the excellent analysis in Salzburg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights Beyond the Terra
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cerned conservation and management of fishery resources over areas
beyond the territorial waters of the United States.96
B. Warrantless Searches by the Coast Guard
In United States v. Warren,97 the Coast Guard boarded a United
States-registered vessel on the high seas to conduct a safety and docu-
mentation inspection. After boarding, the officers spotted marijuana
and arrested the defendants. The vessel was approximately 700 miles
from the United States between Haiti and Cuba in the Westward Pas-
sage. The Coast Guard, at the time of boarding, had no reason to
suspect anyone on board of wrongdoing and had not witnessed any
suspicious activity on the vessel. In addition, the Coast Guard did
not know that the ship's destination was Columbia. On the first ap-
peal, the defendants' conviction was reversed because the boarding
party included officials of the Customs Service and the Drug En-
forcement Agency, as well as Coast Guard officers. Customs agents
are unauthorized to board, question or search without probable cause
to suspect customs violations. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
an en banc 8-6 decision,98 reversed on the basis that the Coast Guard
authority is plenary as to U.S.-flag vessels beyond the twelve-mile
contiguous zone.99 Thus, the Court held that such officials may seize
and board U.S.-flag vessels on the high seas without probable cause
or any other particularized suspicion."
In United States v. Conroy,10 l another Fifth Circuit case, the
conviction of defendants resulting from the search of a U.S.-fiag ves-
sel in foreign territorial waters was also upheld. The court stated
that the authority of the United States to impose its jurisdiction over
U.S.-flag vessels is plenary, regardless of where they are found on the
high seas1"2 or in foreign waters. l10 The Court rejected the defend-
Firma of the United States, in INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING
UNITED STATES COMMUNITY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 107-54 (R. Lillich ed. 1981);
Nanda, Enforcement of US. Laws at Sea-Selected Jurisdicitonal and Evidentiary Issues, in
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED STATES COMMUNITY
LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 155-77 (R. Lillich ed. 1981).
96. United States v. Warren, 550 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc).
97. Id.
98. United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
99. Id. at 1064-65 (upholding the Coast Guard authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89 (1976)).
See the corresponding statute of the United States customs authority under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a)(1976).
100. Id. at 1068.
101. United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1979).
102. See, e.g., Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927).
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ants' contention that apprehension in foreign territorial waters was
illegal. The Court went on to say that if an improper intrusion was
an offense at all, then it was an offense only to the foreign sovereign
whose territory had been violated. 4
The trend of extending United States jurisdiction at sea was tem-
porarily interupted in United States v. Piner.°3 In Piner, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals suppressed marijuana found in a routine
search of a pleasure boat in San Francisco Bay. The Court con-
cluded that the random boarding of a vessel after dark for safety and
registration inspection without cause to suspect noncompliance is not
justified.° 6 The Ninth Circuit went on to hold that a stop-and-board
inspection after dark must be for cause, which required a reasonable
and articulable suspicion of noncompliance, or must be conducted
under written administrative standards so that the decision to search
is not left to the sole discretion of a Coast Guard officer.
10 7
In the case of United States v. Rubies,l"' however, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the authority of the Coast Guard to
board a flagless vessel on the high seas for a certificate and identifica-
tion check. Subsequent to the check, the Coast Guard seized the boat
after finding marijuana. The Court distinguished Piner as a case in
which, unlike Rubies, there was no probable cause to suspect a viola-
tion."° The decision has been criticized and explained by the fact
that Judge Kennedy, a strong dissenter in Piner, was a member of the
Rubies panel." 0
C. Enforcement of United States Fisheries Laws
Enforcement by the Coast Guard of U.S. fisheries laws has also
led to cases contesting United States jurisdiction. In United States v.
F/V Taijo Maru, "' the Coast Guard sighted a Japanese vessel within
the U.S. 1966 Contiguous Fisheries Zone. The Coast Guard, having
reason to believe that the vessel was fishing in the zone in violation of
U.S. fisheries law, gave chase and seized the vessel on the high seas.
The defendants argued that pursuant to Articles 23 and 24 of the
103. Conroy, 589 F.2d at 1266.
104. Id. at 1268. See also The Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102 (1815) (J. Marshall).
105. United States v. Piner, 608 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979).
106. Id. at 361.
107. Id. at 360.
108. United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1979).
109. Id. at 404.
110. See Salzburg, supra note 95, at 131
111. United States v. F/V Taijo Maru, 395 F. Supp. 413 (D. Me. 1975).
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1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas," 2 the United States did
not have the authority to conduct hot pursuit for violation of exclu-
sive fishery rights occurring within twelve miles of the coast." 3 The
Court disagreed with the defendant's contention that a coastal State
could establish a contiguous zone only to enforce its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations. 1 4 Instead, the Court stated
that the legislative history indicated that the drafters of the Geneva
Convention could not agree as to whether a contiguous zone could be
established for the purpose of enforcing domestic fisheries laws."'
Therefore, the Court held that the 1966 Contiguous Fisheries Zone
Act controlled and authorized the actions of the Coast Guard."
16
In United States v. Tsuda Maru,"7 a federal district court up-
held a warrantless search of a Japanese fishing vessel which was
sighted fishing 167 miles from a U.S. island in the Bering Sea and
then seized for violating the Fish and Conservation Act of 1976
(FCMA)." 8 No suspicion or probable cause of a FCMA violation
existed when the Coast Guard initially boarded the vessel for a rou-
tine inspection. The Court, however, interpreted the statutory lan-
guage to authorize warrantless searches." 9 Further justification was
based on a recognized exception to the warrant requirement for
searches of licensees who are authorized by statute in a closely regu-
lated industry.' 2 ° Thus, the Court analogized the regulation of fish-
eries to federal gun control and alcohol regulations-areas of the law
which have traditionally been within the exception to warrant
requirements. 2'
D. Joint Action by United States and Foreign Law Enforcement
Offices
Another group of cases which have raised issues of the propriety
of conduct by law enforcement officials involve situations in which
United States law enforcement officials have participated with foreign
112. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 23, 24, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 520, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
113. F/V Taio Maru, 395 F. Supp. at 419.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 419-20.
116. Id. at 421.
117. United States v. Tsuda Maru, 470 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Alaska 1979).
118. 88 U.S.C. §§ 1801-22 (1976).
119. Tsuda Maru, 470 F.Supp. at 1228.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1230. Also see the excellent analysis of this and the F/V Taiyo Maru cases in
Nanda, supra note 95, at 172-76.
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officials in the investigation, search, arrest and trial of U.S. citi-
zens. 22 These cases, which have involved tax fraud,123 theft of bank
funds,' 24 burglary1 2' and narcotics violations,' 26 have also raised se-
rious questions about the extraterritorial application of United States
constitutional protections. Many have been criticized.
127
E. Enforcement Actions by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission
A series of enforcement actions by the SEC against Swiss and
other foreign numbered accounts reflect a trend by the SEC to assert
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. This trend is reflected in two
recent insider trading cases, SEC v. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, et
al., referred to as the "St. Joe case," '128 and SEC v. Certain Unknown
Purchasers of the Common Stock of Santa Fe International Corpora-
tion. 129 In both cases, allegations were made that customers of Swiss
banks used material non-public information to purchase securities
prior to the public announcement of takeover bids for St. Joe and
Santa Fe. In each case, the SEC was able to override claims made by
foreigners that they were protected from SEC orders by secrecy laws.
In the Santa Fe case, the SEC obtained an order from a U.S. District
Court blocking the transfer of assets of the Santa Fe International
Corporation. The SEC alleged that traders had inside, non-public
information relating to merger discussions, negotiations and propos-
als between Santa Fe and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.
In the Banca della Svizzera Italiana case, 130 a U.S. District
Court ordered the Swiss bank which had bought options in the U.S.
for an American client, to disclose the name of the client to the SEC.
122. See Salzburg, supra note 95, at 133-151.
123. Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977).
124. United States v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977).
125. United States v. Jordan, 23 C.M.A. 525, 50 C.M.R. 664 (1975), 24 C.M.A. 156, 51
C.M.R. 375 (1976).
126. United States v. Mundt, 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
127. See Salzburg, supra note 95, at 133-151.
128. S.E.C. v. Banca della Svizzera Italliana, et. al., 32 Fed. R. Serv.2d 1650 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). The case is so-called because it involved transactions in the common stock of the St. Joe
Minerals Corporation.
129. S.E.C. v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corp.,
No. 81 Civ. 6553 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Fedders, Policing Methods to Obtain Evidence
Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW 89, 100-01 (1984).
130. Banca della Svizzera Italiana, et.al., 32 Fed. R. Serv.2d 1650.
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The Court rejected the Swiss bank's attempt to invoke Swiss secrecy
laws.1"' The SEC charged that several unidentified customers of the
Swiss bank made illegal profits through "insider trading" by buying
options in St. Joe Minerals Corporation knowing that Seagram Com-
pany would announce a takeover.
32
Other enforcement actions by the SEC have been impeded by
the use of financial intermediaries, foreign bank accounts and foreign
secrecy laws. 133 The cases have involved alleged violations of the
Williams Act, 1 34 which requires any person or group of persons who
acquire more than five percent of a class of restricted securities to
disclose their holdings in a filing with the SEC under Sections 13(g)
and (d) of the Exchange Act.' 3  The Williams Act also requires
similar disclosures by persons who make tender offers.'
3 6
Foreign bank secrecy laws have also hindered the investigation
and prosecution of schemes to manipulate the market price of securi-
ties, 137 and to sell securities in the United States in violation of the
"Securities Act."'' 31 In addition, financial intermediaries located in
jurisdictions with secrecy laws have been used as conduits for making
illegal payments,' 39 misappropriating corporate assets"O and laun-
dering funds generated by other illegal activites."1
4
The SEC is aggressively enforcing its regulations by joining fi-
nancial intermediaries as defendants. It has subpoenaed officers of
these institutions as defendants and asked the courts to block their
assets. The SEC is also engaging in discussions with some countries
(for example, Switzerland and the Netherlands) for enhanced cooper-
ation, whether formal or informal. The MOU with Switzerland is a
131. Id.
132. For additional background on these two cases, see Zagaris, The S.E.C. Moves Against
Foreigners Trading on Inside Information, 27 TAXES INT'L 44-45 (Jan. 1982).
133. See Fedders, Policing Internationalized U.S. Capital Markets: Methods to Obtain Evi-
dence Abroad, 18 INT'L LAW. 89, 91-94 (1984).
134. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-459, 90 Stat. 510 (1968).
135. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 13(g) & (h), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78.
136. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. General Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248 (D.D.C. 1975); S.E.C.
v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (Suisse) S.A., No. 77 Civ. 798 (D.D.C. July 10, 1977).
137. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Everest Management Corp., 31 Fed. R. Serv.2d 145 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); S.E.C. v. Edward M. Gilbert, 82 F.R.D. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); S.E.C. v. American Insti-
tute Counselors, Inc., 1975 Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) % 97,388 (D.D.C. 1975).
138. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. American Institute Counselors, Inc., 1975 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,388 (D.D.C. 1975).
139. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 404 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1975).
140. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Vesco, 58 F.R.D. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
141. See, e.g,, S.E.C. v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972).
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result of such negotiations. 142 As a result, Swiss banks are increas-
ingly waiving their rights to bank secrecy. 4 3 Moreover, the Swiss
government has enacted a law on international judicial assistance in
criminal matters.'"
On May 31, 1984, the SEC proposed a federal "waiver by con-
duct" law that would require anyone purchasing securities in the
United States through a foreign bank or brokerage to relinquish the
right to prevent disclosure of information to U.S. authorities. The
consent to disclosure would be implied by the execution of a transac-
tion in the United States. The SEC has released the proposal for
public comment, and it is also recommending that Congress study
the proposal. 145 The SEC acknowledges that the Mutual Assistance
Treaty and the MOU are helpful against persons trying to utilize
Swiss accounts to circumvent U.S. securities laws. However, they do
not apply to all violations of the securities law and are only available
when a specific Swiss account is involved in a transaction. Spokes-
persons for the SEC lament that the current disclosure process is
cumbersome and unavailable during commission investigations. In
addition, the United States cannot negotiate separate agreements
with the many countries that have enacted secrecy or blocking stat-
utes. The SEC also claims that none of these proposals provide the
necessary framework to resolve the jurisdictional and conflict-of-laws
problems. '46
In the area of the foreign commodities trader, the CFTC has
also asserted enforcement actions with extraterritorial effects. On
March 17, 1982, the CFTC entered an order against Ralli Brothers
(Bankers) S.A., 14 7 alleging that Ralli was acting as a foreign broker.
142. For discussion of the Swiss-U.S. negotiations, and the MOU, see Green, US., Switzer-
land Agree to Prosecute Inside Traders, Legal Times, Oct. 4, 1982, at 12. See also Fedders,
supra note 114, at 101-04; Zagaris, The Swiss/US. Consultations on 'Insider Trading', 30
TAXES INT'L 46-47 (Apr. 1982).
143. See, e.g., Hudson & Tennison, Swiss Bank Secrecy Waived for SEC Probe of IU Inter-
national's Former Chairman, Wall St. J., May 17, 1982, at 5, col. 1. The waiver is partly the
result of discussions between the United States and Swiss authorities. See Zagaris, supra note
142, at 46-47.
144. See Switzerland: Law on International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters (Mar.
20, 1981) (translation by Bruno A. Ristau), reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1339
(1981).
145. Ross, SEC Proposes Law to Aid Policing of Foreign Investments, Wash. Post, June 1,
1984, at E2, col. 1; SEC Acts on Foreign Bank Plan, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1984, at Dl 1, col. 6.
146. Fedders, supra note 133, at 104-05.
147. In the Matter of Ralli Brothers (Bankers) S.A., CFTC Docket No. 82-15 (1982). See
also Zagaris, A Swiss Bank is the Object of an Enforcement Order by the US. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission, 32 TAXES INT'L 40 (June 1982).
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The CFTC further alleged that Ralli maintained customer accounts
and traded in platinum futures contracts using an omnibus account
in its own name. The complaint charged that Ralli refused to pro-
vide information concerning the platinum futures contracts traded on
the New York Mercantile Exchange in March-June 1981. As a re-
sult, the CFTC has ordered a public proceeding at a date to be set in
order to determine whether the allegations are true, and if so,
whether Ralli should be prohibited from trading in contract markets
and assessed penalties.
F. Recent Enforcement Actions which have Given Rise to Friction
with Other Countries.
1. Marc Rich. On October 19, 1982, a federal grand jury in-
dicted Marc Rich, Pincus Green and others for fifty-one counts of
tax-evasion, racketeering, mail and wire fraud. The defendants were
also indicted for violating a ban on trading with Iran and for viola-
tions of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Law
(RICO). One year later, the grand jury, purusant to its investigation,
subpoenaed Marc Rich to turn over documents then in control of
Marc Rich & Co. AG, a Swiss corporation, and Marc Rich & Co.
International, its U.S. subsidiary. Marc Rich refused to produce the
requested documents and a Federal District Court imposed a con-
tempt fine of 50,000 dollars per day until the documents were pro-
duced. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the sanction.1
4 8
On August 5, 1983, Marc Rich agreed to produce the docu-
ments. However, the Swiss government, after months of unsuccess-
ful diplomatic attempts to persuade the United States to request the
documents through existing bilateral treaty procedures, took action
to stop the delivery of documents. On August 12, the Swiss federal
prosecutor's office confiscated all the requested documents in posses-
sion of Marc Rich & Co. AG, in Zug, Switzerland. The Swiss au-
thorities also instituted legal proceedings against Marc Rich & Co.
AG, to determine whether compliance with the grand jury subpoena
would violate Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, which prohibits
the disclosure of business secrets to foreigners. Despite the clear im-
plications of a major conflict with Switzerland over the extraterrito-
rial reach of the grand jury subpoena, and the clear inability of Marc
Rich to comply with the contempt order, the Federal District Court
148. Matter of Marc Rich & Co., A.6., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 51
U.S.L.W. 3920 (June 27, 1983).
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declined to rescind the sanctions imposed.
1 49
The Court relied on the "effects and conspiracy" doctrine,
which enabled it to assume jurisdiction over the Swiss corporation
even though the companv did not conduct business in the United
States. 50 In so doing, Judge Sand considered little, if at all, the
conflict with Swiss law. This cavalier attitude to the wide-open asser-
tion of jurisdiction is one of the roots of the present conflict between
the two countries. If deference is not given to established treaty pro-
cedures dealing with the release of secret documents, this conflict be-
tween the United States and Switzerland will continue.
2. X, Y, Z v. The Bank. In a spin-off case to Marc Rich, an
English court in X, Y, Z v. The Bank 51 enjoined the London Branch
of the United States bank from complying with a U.S. District Court
order. The order directed the bank to comply with a grand jury sub-
poena and to furnish all documents in its London branch pertaining
to Marc Rich & Co. AG, its Swiss parent and a third affiliated Pan-
ama company. The injunction was based partly on the Court's ruling
that the applicable law was English because the contractual relation-
ship between the bank and its customer was made in London. More-
over, the consequences of any breach in the contractual relationship
would occur in London. The English court concluded as a matter of
law that an implied contract between the bank and customer existed,
and prohibited the bank, without the consent of the customer, from
disclosing any document or other information obtained by the bank
in the course of that relationship. 2 The cavalier attitude of Judge
Sand in the Marc Rich case toward confidentiality can be contrasted
to the importance attributed by the Queens Bench Judge Legatt to
confidentiality in a common-law, non-statutory setting.
1 53
3. Bank of Nova Scotia, H. In Bank of Nova Scotia II, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, on remand, up-
held a $1.8 million fine against the Bank of Nova Scotia. 54 The fine
149. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings: U.S. v. Marc Rich & Co. A.G., 44 TAXES INT'L 15-
17 (Aug. 25, 1982) (Judge Sands' opinion); Zagaris, Marc Rich Caves In, 46 TAXES INT'L 55
(Aug. 1983).
150. March Rich, 707 F.2d at 668.
151. X, Y & Z v. The Bank, 2 All E.R. 464 (1983).
152. Id.
153. A U.K. Court Enjoins the London Branch of a US. Bank from Supplying Information
to a US. Grand Jury (excerpts from X, Y & Z v. The Bank), 44 TAXES INT'L 4, 10 (AUG. 25,
1982).
154. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 722 F.2d 657
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was imposed because of the bank's failure to comply with the Court's
order to answer a grand jury subpoena. Compliance by the bank
would have required contravention of two orders by a Cayman Is-
land court.'55 The case, now pending in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, involves not only the principal par-
ties-the United States government and the Bank of Nova Scotia-
but also several other governments,' 56 including the United King-
dom, Canada, the Cayman Islands and a host of major banks and
banking associations. The latter are participating as amici curiae. At
issue is whether a U.S. district court has the right to compel the Bank
of Nova Scotia to comply with a grand jury subpoena in violation of
the confidentiality laws of the Cayman Islands.
57
4. The Musella Case. In 1983 the SEC brought a complaint
for unlawful insider-trading against Dominick Musella and nine
other individuals. The SEC alleged that they used inside information
from a law firm to make profitable, illegal transactions. Musella in-
terposed Swiss confidentiality law in order to quash the subpoena.
United States Magistrate Bernikow directed Musella to execute a
waiver of the Swiss provisions regarding secrecy. The Court, in an
order by Judge Haight, rejected Musella's claims that requiring
waiver of the Swiss secrecy provisions violated his right to freedom
from unlawful searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend-
ment.' 58 The Court also rejected his contention that such a waiver
would violate his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth
Amendment.159 The order has been stayed pending an appeal to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
It is important to note that U.S. authorities have not tried to
(11 th Cir. 1983). The case arises from a grand jury investigation concerning allegations of
narcotics trafficking and U.S. tax violations. On March 1, 1983, the Federal Grand Jury issued
a subpoena duces tecum to the Bank of Nova Scotia, requesting documents maintained by the
bank in the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands and Antigua. These documents related to a number
of United States citizens under investigation. The District Court granted the Bank an exten-
sion until May 31 to produce the documents, but on May 31, the Grand Court of the Cayman
Islands issued an order prohibiting the disclosure of the information sought by the subpoena.
On Oct. 20, 1983, after the bank had not complied with its order, the District Court issued an
order holding the bank in contempt and imposed a sanction of $25,000 per day-subsequently
the District Court denied the bank's motion to stay the imposition of sanctions pending appeal.
In supplemental findings, the District Court found that the bank had not exercised good faith
efforts to comply with the subpoena.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 658.
157. See Zagaris, supra note 83.
158. S.E.C. v. Mosella, 578 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
159. Id. at 442.
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obtain the desired information directly from Swiss authorities under
the recently concluded MOU. The frequent use of subpoenas by U.S.
courts and their lack of deference to the laws of Switzerland has ex-
acerbated the growing irritation of Swiss authorities. The Swiss are
perhaps understandably disenchanted with U.S. authorities who con-
tinue to ignore established procedures yet criticize the Swiss for fail-
ing to cooperate."
5. The Falconer Case. In the Falconer case, Ian Falconer, an
English attorney residing and practicing law in the Cayman Islands,
was served with a grand jury subpoena while in the United States.
Falconer was not the target of the grand jury investigation, but
merely an intermediary who possessed desired documents. The
United States ignored the procedures of the U.S.-Cayman Informa-
tion Exchange Agreement, and additionally never revealed to Cay-
man authorities why the documents were required, other than stating
that they were needed in an investigation of tax fraud.
The overreaching of the Justice Department is highlighted in the
Falconer case because jurisdiction over Falconer was highly tenuous.
Falconer's only contacts with the United States were vacation trips
and cricket team tours. Moreover, Falconer never transacted even
unrelated business in the United States. In contrast, in Bank of Nova
Scotia, the bank had a branch transacting business in the United
States. Nevertheless, the U.S. Attorney's Office requested an arrest
warrant when Falconer moved to quash the subpoena.
1 61
IV. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO ENFORCE AND ADJUDICATE
A. Foreign Government Diplomats
The United States is a party to several important multilateral
treaties as well as a wide network of consular treaties concerning
criminal jurisdiction over diplomats. 162 The Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations embodies the first comprehensive code entered
160. See Zagaris, supra note 84. The Swiss are especially disenchanted in light of the
amount of cooperation and resources they devote to international enforcement demands of the
United States.
161. In re: Grand Jury 83-4 (FL) (S.D. Fla. Case No. FGJ 8304 (FL)). See Harwood, The
United States Wants to Arrest Ian Falconer for His 'Utter Contempt' of Jake Snyder, 56 TAXES
INT'L 3 (June 1984).
162. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations]; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S.
No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
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into by the international community concerning diplomatic conduct
and relations.1 63  The Convention provides:
(1) Diplomatic agents enjoy immunity from criminal juris-
diction of the receiving State;1
64
(2) Immunity from criminal jurisdiction is extended to all
members of the family of a diplomatic agent;
165
(3) Immunity from criminal jurisdictiion is extended to the
members of the administrative and techincal staffs of the mission
and their families;
166
(4) Immunity from criminal jurisdiction is extended to ser-
vice staffs in respect to acts performed in the course of their du-
ties;1 6 7 and
(5) Private servants are granted limited immuities to the ex-
tent "admitted by the receiving State".
168
In practice, the rules governing diplomatic immunity and ex-
emptions from criminal jurisdiction are relatively uniform when ap-
plied to the conduct of heads of diplomatic missions and the official
members of their staffs. However, there is no uniform agreement in
the establishment of guidelines for servants, subordinate staff mem-
bers and families of diplomatic personnel.
1 69
B. International Organization Diplomats
The enactment of the International Organizations Immunities
Act 1 7 extended immunity from suit and legal process to officers and
employees of international organizations. In 1946 the General Con-
vention of Privileges and Immunities was adopted by resolution of
the UN General Assembly.' 71 The Convention provides privileges
and immunities to three classes of officials: (1) the Secretary-General
and all Assistant Secretaries who have full diplomatic immunity, (2)
specialized agencies and their staffs and (3) officials and experts on
special assignments.
163. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 162.
164. Id. art. 31.
165. Id. art. 37(1).
166. Id. art. 37(2).
167. Id. art. 37(3).
168. Id. art. 37(4).
169. Wilson, Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: the Retinue and Families of the Diplo-
matic Immunities, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1265 (1965); Sutton, Jurisdiction over Diplomatic
Personnel and International Organizations Personnel for Common Crimes and for Internation-
ally Defined Crimes, in BASSIOUNI & NANDA, supra note 2, at 97 (1973).
170. 22 U.S.C. 288 (1976).
171. See text in U.N. Yearbook, 1946-47.
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Although diplomatic personnel are immune from criminal juris-
diction, they are nevertheless required to obey the laws of the receiv-
ing State. The method most frequently used to redress a violation of
the law of the receiving State by a diplomat is for the receiving State
to file a complaint with the person charged with the violation. The
most serious action which a host State can enforce against an unco-
operative diplomat is expulsion. Such a measure, however, is rarely
employed and is usually reserved for political issues, such as partici-
pation by an agent in the internal affairs of the host country.172
C. Non-Legal Limitations
Non-legal limitations, primarily political and sometimes eco-
nomic, may prevent States from exercising jurisdiction. Two non-
U.S. jurisdiction situations serve as examples. In February 1976, a
controversy arose due to reports of involvement by British nationals
serving as mercenaries in the Angolan Civil War. A government
committee was established under Lord Diplock to investigate
whether the British Foreign Enlistment Act 173 was adequate to con-
trol the recruitment of British citizens as mercenaries. In August
1976, the Diplock Committee released a report which recommended
the abolition of those portions of the Foreign Enlistment Act which
made it a crime for British nationals to enlist as mercenaries. 74 The
Diplock Report's principle reason for decriminalizing foreign enlist-
ment was the impossibility of extraterritorial enforcement of British
law. One recent commentator, however, after reviewing the authori-
ties on jurisdictional enforcement, concluded that ample legal au-
thority existed to support jurisdiction.
1 75
The incidents arising out of the Cubana air crash in October
1976 demonstrate the non-legal factors which are involved in deci-
sions to assert jurisdiction. The Cubana airliner arrived in Barbados
from Guyana and Trinidad and then took-off from Barbados en route
to Jamaica. Nine minutes after take-off an explosion on board forced
the plane to return to Barbados. It crashed in the sea, killing all
seventy-three persons on board. Two persons were arrested in Trini-
dad within two days of the crash and confessed that they had placed
172. See C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 469-80 (3d ed. 1948).
173. British Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870, 33,34, 35 Vict., ch. 90.
174. Report of The Privy Counsellors Appointed to Inquire into the Recruitment of Merce-
naries (August 1976).
175. Chase, Aspects of Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction on Anglo-American Practice,
II INT'L LAW. 655-65 (1977). Chase concludes that social and economic reasons overrode
legal considerations.
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the explosives on the plane in Barbados. Although ample jurisdic-
tional bases existed under both common law and the Montreal Con-
vention,' 76 which had been incorporated into Barbados law under the
Civil Aviation Act of 1976, Barbados declined to exercise jurisdic-
tion. During the confessions of the two arrested Venezuelan nation-
als, they stated that they were working as agents of the Central
Intelligence Agency. The vehement protests by Cuba against the
United States added sensitive political overtones to the incident. The
complex political and evidentiary elements, along with the enormous
expense of trying the case led Barbados to decline to exercise jurisdic-
tion. Instead, the persons were returned to Venezuela and are being
held pending trial.
177
V. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS
The clearest trend in jurisdiction over international criminal
matters has been the United States' assertion of broader extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. This has been reflected in the drafts of the revised
criminal code bill in recent Congressional sessions,"' and is amply
demonstrated by the extension of export controls on oil and gas
goods and technology to the Soviet Union, the interdiction of foreign
vessels on high seas if they are suspected of carrying undocumented
aliens and IRS proposed regulations on record disclosure by foreign
corporations. These examples evidence the fact that the United
States is asserting broader extraterritorial jurisdiction in order to en-
force its laws. Court and administrative tribunals are consistently
requiring persons abroad to comply with subpoenas or requests to
furnish information.
Unfortunately, the expansion of jurisdiction has led to increas-
ing conflicts between United States and foreign law. The resulting
176. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(Montreal Convention), Jan. 26, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 564.
177. For additional discussion of the incidents, see Zagaris, International Criminal Cooper-
ation in the British West Indies to Prevent and Control Violence: Developments and Prospects, 2
QUADERNI 265, 291-95 (Int'l. Instit. of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Sicily,
May 1979) (copy on file in the offices of Bruce Zagaris). See also BARBADOS GOV'T., REPORT
OF THE COMM. ON ENQUIRY ON THE CUBANA AIR CRASH OF OcT. 6, 1976 (Pts. I and II);
Two Sensational Developments in the Cubana Crash, 10 CARIBBEAN CONTACT 1 (July 1982).
178. Criminal Code Revision Act of 1981, H.R. 1647 97th Cong., 1st Sess, 22 CONG. REC.
370 (1981). See, e.g., United States v. Toyota, 569 F. Supp. 1158 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Empson,
The Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the Jurisdiction, 6 AMER. CRIM.
L.Q. 32 (1967); Epstein, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Proposed Criminal Justice Act of
1975-S.I., 4 AM. J. CRIM. L. 275 (1975-76); Reports on Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 34
Bus. L. 726, 750-59 (Jan. 1979); Note, Extraterritorial Reach of Proposed Federal Criminal
Code, 13 HARV. INT'L L.J. 346 (1972).
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antagonism has resulted in blocking legislation and in turn has led
some members of the United States international legal community to
recognize the need for more restraint in applying our criminal juris-
diction extraterritorially. However, those recognizing such a need
are at present a clear minority comprised mostly of academicians.
Another result of the increase in United States extraterritorial
criminal jurisdiction has been the increased discussion with foreign
governments over the need for more cooperation concerning jurisdic-
tional conflicts. In some cases the cooperation has been formalized
in treaties of mutual assistance in criminal matters.' 79 Some of these
treaties obligate foreign countries to render assistance in exchange for
agreements by the United States government to exhaust cooperative
remedies prior to using unilateral measures.
In order to harmonize these conflicts, more cooperation must
occur. Increased dialogue and agreement between governments is re-
quired to minimize the friction which results from the perception
that some governments are asserting jurisdiction in violation of inter-
national law. Developments in the United States and other legal sys-
tems must move in two directions. First, judicial decisions must
expressly consider the needs of the international system. Second,
governments must participate in conventions which provide mecha-
nisms by which conflicting assertions of jurisdiction may be resolved.
One commentator has criticized Section 403 and other sections
of Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law for not sufficiently clarifying the weight that courts should give
to differing societal and political assumptions.1 80 The Restatement
has also been criticized for not specifying the values that should influ-
ence United States courts in contributing to the legitimation of inter-
national jurisdictional norms. 8 1 In transnational regulatory cases,
the interests and values of a foreign State or of the international legal
system are more difficult to perceive and weigh than the political and
social values of the court's municipal system. Hence, a United States
court will usually not identify or recognize the values or legitimacy of
protecting business documents or the anonymity of investors when
balanced against U.S. interests.'8 2 Increasingly, U.S. courts have
given little consideration to foreign laws and injunctions which forbid
179. Another result has been discussion between countries with mutual assistance treaties
in an effort to improve the treaties. For example, the United States and Switzerland have
engaged in such discussions.
180. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 403.
181. Maier, supra note 3, at 316-318. Cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 60, at 329.
182. See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1981).
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compliance with discovery orders and subpoenas issued by United
States courts.
It has been advocated that a revision of the Restatement should
emphasize the importance of expressly evaluating the needs of the
international system when determining whether jurisdiction exists
under Section 403 or other applicable sections. According to at least
one scholar, the Tentative Draft gives insufficient direction in deter-
mining jurisdictional questions. While it identifies the contacts con-
sidered relevant in determining whether an appropriate link exists
between the regulating State and the events and parties in question, it
does not enunciate the values that influence the balancing of these
contacts under the reasonableness standard. These basic values
should emphasize the importance of the international system's needs
and comity. This argument, however, has failed to articulate any
specific language which should be incorporated in the Draft Restate-
ment.183 One means of providing for the needs of the international
system is to emphasize in Section 403 of the Draft Restatement the
importance of regulations to the international political, legal or eco-
nomic system and the extent to which such regulation is consistent
with the traditions of the international system. New language under-
lying the values of the international system should be considered.
Equally important as the need in adjudicating jurisdictional is-
sues is the desirability of creating conflict-resolution mechanisms.
This would provide a source with which States could confer on is-
sues, communicate in sensitive, difficult cases and consult regularly
with other governments on developing values and mechanisms for
resolving matters of international criminal jurisdiction. Currently,
the best document which the United States can use to confer and
conciliate is the Draft European Convention on Conflicts of Jurisdic-
tion in Criminal Matters. The Convention, in addition to providing
for jurisdictional bases and assigning priorities to these different ba-
ses, also requires cooperation among members of the Convention in
its application. The tradition, stability and identity of values among
the Council of Europe's members facilitates the application of this
and other conventions concerning international criminal matters. In
the short run, the United States is likely to conclude bilateral agree-
ments on jurisdiction such as the recently concluded Memorandum
of Understanding on Jurisdiction on Insider Trader between the
183. Maier, supra note 3, at 318.
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United States and Switzerland. 84 Although such a transitional doc-
ument provides cooperation on a narrow subject matter, the negotia-
tion of a series of such agreements would be more inefficient than one
general agreement.
The European Committee on Crime Problems of the Council of
Europe, in order to simplify and rationalize the many conventions on
international criminal cooperations, is consolidating the existing trea-
ties into a type of model code. The model code provides for coopera-
tion in penal matters and contains four chapters on the principle
methods of mutual assistance in penal matters, that is, extradition,
mutual assistance, prosecution and enforcement. Another example
of an attempt to use conventions is the exchange of tax information
provisions in the proposed Caribbean Basin Initiative. 85 In the
short-term future, the United States government will probably coop-
erate increasingly with other governments in order to expand its ju-
risdiction. The addition of clearer standards for the judiciary in
determining extraterritorial application of criminal laws in conjunc-
tion with bilateral and multilateral agreements should lead to cer-
tainty and predictability in determining questions of international
criminal law. In the absence of clearer judicial standards and en-
hanced cooperation, more tensions between governments with con-
flicting jurisdictional claims over criminal matters will result.
One policy change that will improve cooperation by foreign gov-
ernments is the active participation by the United States in regional
cooperative arrangements such as the European Committee on
Crime Problems. Regional organizations facilitate criminal justice
planning, legislation, enforcement and adjudication of crime.' 86 Or-
ganizations such as the United Nations Commission for the Preven-
tion of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD), Interpol and
the Regional Police Training Center are already engaged in interna-
tional criminal cooperation.' 87
A long-term solution is to have a truly international court re-
184. For a discussion of the Memorandum, see Zagaris, The U.S. and Switzerland Agree to
Cooperate on Insider Trading, 36 TAXES INT'L 52 (Oct. 1982).
185. Caribbean Basin Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67 (codified 26 U.S.C. § 222(c) 1983).
See Zagaris, A Caribbean Perspective of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 18 INT'L LAW. 563, 576-
81 (1984).
186. See Zagaris and Papavizas, Stopping the Illegal Narcotics Trade in the Caribbean-
New Regional Approaches (submission to the Inter-American Juridical Committee, O.A.S.,
June 1984).
187. See, e.g., Zagaris, supra note 177, at 265-316; see also Zagaris, The Regional Police
Training Center in the West Indies: A Model of Intergovernmental Cooperation in Criminal
Justice, 8 J. POLICE SCI. & AD. 460-64 (1980).
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solve fractious jurisdictional issues. The International Court of Jus-
tice at the Hague has periodically heard international criminal cases
under the rubric of a damage or injunctive relief action. t8 The
Court, however, needs a charter expansion to be able to deal effec-
tively with issues of international criminal law.'8 9 A further sugges-
tion has been the establishment of an international criminal court.
Although the concept is far from being instituted, it is gaining sup-
port.'90 A more likely alternative in the short-term is a special pur-
pose or even temporary international criminal court for specific types
of crime such as aggression, terrorism or international narcotics
trafficking. '"'
Another possibility is a regional international criminal court,
which could at least resolve jurisdictional conflicts in the region.
192
Mediation might also prove a workable mechanism.' 93 Bilateral or
regional treaties of mutual assistance, while providing specifically for
the modes and precedence of procedures, could provide for media-
tion or arbitration in the event of an alleged dispute over jurisdiction.
188. Such cases include the case of Tehran hostages and the recent Nicaragua case.
189. The New Horizons of International Criminal Law, QUADERNI (forthcoming) (Int'l In-
stit. of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Siracusa, Sicily, May 1984) (copy on file in the
offices of Bruce Zagaris).
190. For example, the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and Control, at its
Eighth Session, urged that the Member States pursue acceptance of an international criminal
convention in order to render the prosecution and adjudication of transnational and interna-
tional crimes more effective. See U.N. Doc. E/AC.57/1984/L.3 (1984). The idea of the crea-
tion of such a court has been on the agenda of every General Assembly since 1977, and the
responses of the governments have been increasingly favorable.
191. Id. at 9.
192. Id. at 8.
193. Id. at 18.
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